Imputation (ethics)

Imputation (imputed, imputed, attributed, or attributed) implies a judgment of an act, an action, or a behavior in moral theory. The ruling asserts that a perpetrator has caused a crime which he has committed. It is said that the act is "imputed" to the individual by the judgment, that is, the act is regarded as his free work, he is declared a free author, a free author. A prerequisite for the imputability of an act is the responsibility of the individual; are intellect or will inhibited, the individual is in the state of complete or partial insanity.

In the religious context, the imputation is about the assertion that it is possible for the perpetrator to be good and evil. Among the great philosophers, scholasticism has disputed whether the assertion of free causation relates only to the action (freedom of action), or to the will which causes action (freedom of will). A further question arises as to whether and to what extent the perpetrator is not only the deeds of his free work, but also the consequences of these deeds.

Kant combines the concept of imputation with the distinction of two modes of causation. An act, he explains, can only be imputed to someone if it is the beginning of a new cause chain, but is not itself caused. He calls this unconscious causation "transcendental freedom," "absolute spontaneity," or "causality from freedom," and confronts them with "natural causality," in which every cause is itself caused. Kant, according to Kant, is only able to explain a free act, ie, imputable act, in the Kantian sense that the actor is oriented to a law.

The concept of imputation is connected in ethics with that of responsibility. Some authors bind the responsibility of an individual for an act of imputability, ie, responsibility, others (such as Sören Kierkegaard, Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann) strictly distinguish between accountability and accountability. Edit source text Single-level Edit source text

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